Based on an original synthesis of the work of Marx and Bergson, the key theorists of capitalism and creativity, the book presents an astonishing analysis of ...

Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or “closeness to the truth” (1998). The second is a shift from a numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions (2010). We argue that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, we employ a (slightly-generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012), who show that (...) there is no strictly proper scoring rule for imprecise probabilities. -/- The question then is what should give way. Joyce, who is well aware of this no-go result, thinks that a quantifiability constraint on epistemic accuracy should be relaxed to accommodate imprecision. We argue instead that another Joycean assumption — called strict immodesty— should be rejected, and we prove a representation theorem that characterizes all “mildly” immodest measures of inaccuracy. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.

The problem of Evolutionary Altruism (EA) "is to show how\nbehaviors that benefit others at the expense of self can\nevolve;" group selection is the key to the solution of this\nproblem. The problem of Psychological Altruism (PA) is to\ndetermine whether people "have altruistic desires that are\npsychologically ultimate." After carefully considering the\narguments of both psychologists and philosophers, Sober and\nWilson render the verdict "not proven." But just in the\nnick of time, evolutionary biology rides to the rescue; it\nsucceeds where psychology and philosophy fail in\nvindicating our (...) good nature. In this paper, I will discuss\nSober and Wilson's treatment of PA. (edited). (shrink)

In their marvelous book, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Sober and Wilson identify two distinct problems of altruism.’ The problem of Evolutionary Altruism (EA) “is to show how behaviors that benefit others at the expense of self can evolve;” (17) group selection is the key to the solution of this problem. The problem of Psychological Altruism (PA) is to determine whether people “have altruistic desires that are psychologically ultimate.” (201) After carefully considering the arguments of (...) both psychologists and philosophers, Sober and Wilson render the verdict “not proven.” But just in the nick of time, evolutionary biology rides to the rescue; it succeeds where psychology and philosophy fail in vindicating our good nature. In this paper, I will discuss Sober and Wilson’s treatment of PA. (shrink)

Human geography, as a subject, has become widely recognized since its connections with the social sciences have widened and deepended the study of people, places and social structures. Horizons in Human Geography provides a clear and accessible sketch map of some of the latest and most promising developments in the subject. The book starts by assessing the role and limitations of techniques, models and theories and proceeds to provide a broad-ranging overview of the major social, cultural, urban, regional, political, economic (...) and environmental issues confronting geographers today. Contents: Introduction; Part I: Beyond The Quantitative Revolution; Part II: People and Places, Societies and Spaces; Part III: Explorations in the City; IV: Landscapes of Production; Part V: Regional Geographies and Global Perspectives; Part VI: Politicising The Environment. Contributors: Derek Gregory, Rex Walford, Michael J. Clark, Alan Wilson, R. J. Johnston, John Eyles, Denis Cosgrove, Linda McDowell, Roger Lee, Keith Bassett, John Short, Richard Dennis, Ian Douglas, Doreen Massey, Richard Meegan, John Harriss, Barbara Hariss, Nigel Thrift, Michael Taylor, Peter Taylor, Graham E. Smith, Stuart Cobridge, Judith Rees, Timothy O'Riordan and Bill Mead. (shrink)

In An Autobiography, R.G. Collingwood offers a strikingly compact reductio ad absurdum of John Cook Wilson's metaphysical realism. Cook Wilson formulates the thesis as the inefficacy of epistemic states to determine the properties of objects of knowledge. He explains realism, according to Collingwood, as the view that 'knowing makes no difference to what is known'. Collingwood objects that any such formulation is 'meaningless'. The problem is that by implication the metaphysical realist is supposed to know that Cook (...) class='Hi'>Wilson's principle is true, which requires the realist per impossibile to know what something is like even when its properties are unknown. (shrink)

The chapter focusses on the Scottish natural philosophy of the late eighteenth century represented by John Anderson (1726–1796) and John Robison (1739–1805), which is considered a link between Newton’s natural philosophy and nineteenth-century physics in Britain (Kelvin and Maxwell). Anderson and Robison have to be seen in a tradition of Scottish Newtonians established in the seventeenth century by David Gregory and John Keill and specifically shaped in the Mid-eighteenth century through the chemical-physical work of Joseph Black and the common-sense (...) philosophy of Thomas Reid. These latter Newtonians built on Newton’s theory of matter and short-range forces as indicated in Query 31 of his Opticks (Black) but also on his Rules of Reasoning of the second edition of his Principia (Black and Reid) and in this way created the theoretical framework in which Anderson and Robison developed their natural philosophy. In the center of their natural philosophy, which was oriented on experimental investigations, were the manifold open questions of the Baconian sciences of that time - theories of heat, light, electricity, magnetism as well as the understanding of the phlogiston. The chapter thus provides insight into the specific way in which the Newtonian camp participated in early modern natural philosophical speculations about minute particles of matter, fluids, or the propagation of light and heat. (shrink)

In earlier work (“Why irony is pretence”, in S. Nichols (ed) The Architecture of Imagination, Oxford University Press, 2006) I have argued for a version of the pretence theory of irony — a version according to which the ironist is pretending to adopt a perspective which is defective in some way. I also contrasted this version of the pretence theory with the echoic theory of Sperber and Wilson, concluding that the pretence theory is superior. Deirdre Wilson has now (...) responded to this paper (“The pragmatics of verbal irony : echo or pretence?” Lingua 116 (2006) 1722-1743). In the present paper I respond to Wilson’s counterarguments. I also generate a counterexample to the echoic theory which helps to show that, contrary to what some have thought, the echoic and pretence theories are not equivalent. Finally, I consider some of the consequences for literary theory of thinking of irony as pretending to have a defective point of view. (shrink)

This book's subtitle, as well as its inclusion in Yale University Press's philosophy catalog, creates the expectation of a philosophical match between, in one corner, the ideas of Michael Oakeshott and Leo Strauss and, in the other, the ideas of such "postmodernist" thinkers as Michel Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty, and behind them such gray eminences as Heidegger and Kojève. One soon discovers, however, that Devigne deals not with philosophical responses to postmodernism, but with political responses to (...) postmodernity--a sociological category described only in the most superficial terms. Devigne's account of these political responses is further constricted by his method of treating Strauss's ideas in the context of American conservatism and Oakeshott's ideas in the context of British conservatism. Thus, instead of illuminating the meaning of Strauss's work in the light of Plato, Farabi, and Maimonides, Devigne places him in the company of such writers as Daniel Bell, James Q. Wilson, and Michael Novak. In his chapter on Oakeshott, Devigne only superficially connects Oakeshott to Hobbes, Hegel, and Bradley, while failing to mention Augustine and Montaigne, but he does manage to devote a third of a page to the arcana of the British budget between 1971 and 1977. Recasting Conservatism is, in short, less a work of political philosophy than a work of political science or sociology. (shrink)

This rich and varied collection of essays addresses some of the most fundamental human questions through the lenses of philosophy, literature, religion, politics, and theology. Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey have fashioned an interdisciplinary consideration of such perennial and enduring issues as the relationship between nature and history, nature and grace, reason and revelation, classical philosophy and Christianity, modernity and postmodernity, repentance and self-limitation, and philosophy and politics.

Current understanding of the development of quantity representations is based primarily on performance in the number‐line task. We posit that the data from number‐line tasks reflect the observer's underlying representation of quantity, together with the cognitive strategies and skills required to equate line length and quantity. Here, we specify a unified theory linking the underlying psychological representation of quantity and the associated strategies in four variations of the number‐line task: the production and estimation variations of the bounded and unbounded number‐line (...) tasks. Comparison of performance in the bounded and unbounded number‐line tasks provides a unique and direct way to assess the role of strategy in number‐line completion. Each task produces a distinct pattern of data, yet each pattern is hypothesized to arise, at least in part, from the same underlying psychological representation of quantity. Our model predicts that the estimated biases from each task should be equivalent if the different completion strategies are modeled appropriately and no other influences are at play. We test this equivalence hypothesis in two experiments. The data reveal all variations of the number‐line task produce equivalent biases except for one: the estimation variation of the bounded number‐line task. We discuss the important implications of these findings. (shrink)

Subjectivism about well-being holds that ϕ is intrinsically good for x if and only if, and to the extent that, ϕ is valued, under the proper conditions, by x. Given this statement of the view, there is room for intramural dissent among subjectivists. One important source of dispute is the phrase “under the proper conditions”: Should the proper conditions of valuing be actual or idealized? What sort of idealization is appropriate? And so forth. Though these concerns are of the first (...) importance, this essay focuses on a second source of dispute. As stated, subjectivists must account for what it means for an individual x to value ϕ under any conditions. Though there has been some disagreement, most subjectivists hold that x values ϕ if and only if x desires ϕ. This essay argues that subjectivists have erred in accepting a desiderative theory of valuing. Instead, it argues that subjectivists should hold that x values ϕ to the extent that x judges or believes that ϕ is good for x. The resulting “judgment subjectivism” is intuitively superior to, and maintains important structural advantages over, its desiderative rival. (shrink)

One important proposal about the nature of well-being, prudential value or the personal good is that intrinsic values for a person ought to ‘resonate’ with the person for whom they are good. Indeed, virtually everyone agrees that there is something very plausible about this necessary condition on the building blocks of a good life. Given the importance of this constraint, however, it may come as something of a surprise how little reason we actually have to believe it. In this paper, (...) I'd like to do two things: first, to illustrate just how philosophically tenuous this thesis is, despite its apparent attraction, and to correct, or at least begin to correct, this state of affairs. My argument—which I call the ‘relationship to value’ argument—focuses in part on what it means to be a valuer—specifically, the peculiar relationship valuing agents bear to objects of value. (shrink)

University of Alberta Forthcoming in Utilias Consider Lives for Headaches: there is some number of headaches such that the relief of those headaches is sufficient to outweigh the good life of an innocent person. Lives for Headaches is unintuitive, but difficult to deny. The argument leading to Lives for Headaches is valid, and appears to be constructed out of firmly entrenched premises. In this paper, I advocate one way to reject Lives for Headaches; I defend a form of lexical superiority (...) between values. Based on an inquiry into the notion of human well-being, I argue that no amount of headaches is sufficient to outweigh the disvalue of the loss of a good life. Though this view has been thought subject to devastating objections, these objections are not dispositive against the form of value superiority I advance here. (shrink)

We examine the problem of generating definite noun phrases that are appropriate referring expressions; that is, noun phrases that (a) successfully identify the intended referent to the hearer whilst (b) not conveying to him or her any false conversational implicatures (Grice, 1975). We review several possible computational interpretations of the conversational implicature maxims, with different computational costs, and argue that the simplest may be the best, because it seems to be closest to what human speakers do. We describe our recommended (...) algorithm in detail, along with a specification of the resources a host system must provide in order to make use of the algorithm, and an implementation used in the natural language generation component of the IDAS system. (shrink)

Concentrating on genetics, this paper examines the strength of the links between our biological science -- our biology -- and the particular history which brought that science into being. Would quite different histories have produced roughly the same science? Or, on the contrary, would different histories have produced other, quite different biologies? One emphasis throughout is on the kinds of evidence that might be brought to bear from the actual past in order to assess claims about what might have been. (...) Another emphasis is on the implications for debates on realism and antirealism about genes. (shrink)

In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema's central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it (...) is always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other's wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility, yet rarely discussed in depth, always presenting his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing--especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact--is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing. "In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema has made an immensely important contribution to the discussion of group morality and collective responsibility both within and far beyond professional academic philosophy. His clearly written book will be essential reading." --Fergus Kerr, Honorary Fellow, University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

Gatchel, R. H. The evolution of the concept.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and rationality.--Green, T. F. Indoctrination and beliefs.--Kilpatrick, W. H. Indoctrination and respect for persons.--Atkinson, R. F. Indoctrination and moral education.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and doctrines.--Moore, W. Indoctrination and democratic method.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and freedom.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and religion.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination and intentions.--Crittenden, B. S. Indoctrination as mis-education.--Snook, I. A. Indoctrination and moral responsibility.--Gregory, I. M. M. and Woods, R. G. Indoctrination: inculcating doctrines.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination (...) without doctrines? (shrink)

Pylyshyn is willing to assume that attention can influence feature integration. We argue that he concedes too much. Feature integration occurs preattentively, except in the case of certain “perverse” displays, such as those used in feature-conjunction searches.